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Criminal Mind or Inculpable
Adolescence?
A Glimpse at the History, Failures,
and Required Changes of the
American Juvenile Correction
System
Christopher J. Menihan* **
In 1987, thirteen-year-old Craig Price crept out of his
parents’ house in Warwick, Rhode Island, into the night, and
through the back door of Becky Spencer’s home two houses
away.1 Price found the twenty-seven-year-old single mother
asleep on her living room floor. He also found a ten-inch kitchen
knife.2 “A strange sense of awareness settled upon me,” Price
later explained, “and with this awareness came this raw and
savage sense of outrage that completely consumed me. It was
time (to) kill.”3 Price stabbed Spencer with ferocity, nearly
burying the ten-inch blade.4 Fifty-eight thrusts later, when
Spencer finally stopped moving, when he knew she was dead,
Price subsided.5 The knife had punctured Spencer’s heart, lungs
and liver, and also penetrated her face and head.6 Spencer’s
* Christopher J. Menihan is a 2015 Juris Doctor Candidate at Pace University
School of Law. He graduated summa cum laude from the University of Rhode
Island in 2012 with a Bachelors of Arts in English, participated in Pace Law
School’s Federal Judicial Honors Program, and is a Senior Editor of PACE LAW
REVIEW.
** I would like to thank my Mother, my Father, Courtney, Cydney and Dan,
without whose unconditional support this Comment would never have been
written.
1. Mark Arsenault, ‘Into Another World’—Craig Price’s Story, THE
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 7, 2004, at A-01 [hereinafter Into Another World].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Mark Arsenault, ‘This Dark Deed’—Craig Price’s Story, THE
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murder went unsolved, and Price was smug: “I truly felt like
getting away with it was my fate and destiny. I really felt clever
and supreme. I acted just like everybody else who thought a
killer walked their neighborhood streets.”7
Two years later in 1989, fifteen-year-old Price murdered
again.8 This time, however, his crime was exponentially more
brutal. Price again crept surreptitiously from his parents’ house
and through the neighborhood, this time towards Joan Heaton’s
home one street away.9 Price cut the window screen with a steak
knife he was carrying.10 Thirty-nine-year-old Heaton’s body
exhibited eleven stab wounds to the chest, face and neck, rib and
skull fractures, and numerous injuries from blunt trauma.11 The
body of her daughter, fifth-grader Mellissa Heaton, displayed
seven stab wounds and evidence of having been similarly
beaten.12 Jennifer Heaton, two years younger than her sister
Melissa, was also found dead. She had been stabbed sixty-two
times and her skull had been fractured.13
Price suffered a heightened perception of the prejudices that
others projected towards his African-American heritage.14
Shortly before Spencer’s murder, Price and some friends had
been playing manhunt in the neighborhood.15 The killer recalls
a man bellowing racial epithets from Spencer’s property, which
weighed on Price so acutely that it culminated in “the strongest
desire to murder.”16 Two weeks before murdering them, Price
met Heaton and her daughters for the first time.17 As he walked
through their Warwick neighborhood, Price noticed the family
out for a bike ride.18 He offered to fix a chain that had slipped

PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 8, 2004, at A-01 [hereinafter This Dark Deed].
7. Id.
8. This Dark Deed, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Into Another World, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. This Dark Deed, supra note 6.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7

2

2014 CRIMINAL MIND OR INCULPABLE ADOLESCENCE?

763

off one of the girls’ bikes.19 As he fixed the chain, Price sensed
an aura of racial bigotry emanating from Heaton, and
interpreted the girls’ giggling as similarly rooted in the same
perceived racism.20 A few days later, Price claims to have
noticed Heaton eyeing him from her window as he was walking
home.21 What Price perceived as Heaton’s contemptuous racism
spun him into “an absolute dark rage.”22 Then, “a solution came
to him. Kill her. . . . I knew the act of killing Joan Heaton was
the answer.”23
Found at the Heaton residence were a bloody handprint,
blood stains in areas away from the bodies, and band-aid
wrappers on the floor.24 Investigators deduced that the killer
had been cut during scuffles that undoubtedly accompanied the
murders.25 Warwick police officers and FBI agents began
investigating the Heaton murders, keeping their eyes open for
suspects with lacerations to the hand.26 While patrolling
Metropolitan Drive in Warwick, two police officers observed a
group of teenagers walking down the street.27 Price was among
them.28 The officers stopped the teens and one of them noticed
gauze on Price’s finger.29 Price maintained that he had cut his
finger while breaking into a car, but there was no police report
to corroborate his story.30 Price was subjected to and failed a
polygraph test, and a search of a tool shed in his parents’ yard
uncovered the weapons used to murder Spencer and the
Heatons.31
Price’s case was adjudicated in Rhode Island Family Court,
where he was found guilty of two counts of burglary and four

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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counts of murder.32 The court ordered the fifteen-year-old
quadruple murderer—who would later become known as “The
Warwick Slasher”—to be held at the Rhode Island Training
School until he reached age twenty-one, a sentence of less than
six years.33 The Family Court judge’s hands were tied:
“Pursuant to the statutes then in effect. . .[t]his was the
maximum penalty that the Family Court could impose.”34
***
I.

Introduction

This Comment provides an historical analysis of the
principles, understandings and laws that have formed and
altered the American juvenile correction system.35 Part I offers
an historical synopsis of the societal understanding that juvenile
offenders are less culpable than their adult counterparts and
explains the process by which this concept came to permeate
early American common law.
By discussing the early
nineteenth-century juvenile correction reformation movement
and the cases that followed, Part I also illustrates the
development and early failures of the American juvenile
correction system. Part II explains the history of juvenile waiver
laws, from their early presence in the American juvenile
correction system to their stringent nationwide alteration
during the 1980s and 90s. In Part III, this Comment discusses
the unconstitutional results of increased juvenile waiver
legislation and examines the United States Supreme Court’s
judicial correction of such effects. Part IV concludes that despite
the roadblocks to effectuating necessary changes within the
juvenile correction system, the interaction among various
omnipresent and undeniable forces requires that the States and
their judiciaries do so.
32. See State v. Price, 820 A.2d 956, 959 (R.I. 2003).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. This Comment uses “correction system,” “correctional officer” and
other like terms for their colloquial value only, and does not intend to suggest
that such entities live up to their titles, titles which imply that such entities
partake in the active correction of criminals.
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II. History, Development, and Early Failures of the American
Juvenile Correction System
A. Historical Treatment of Juvenile Malefactors
The understanding that juvenile offenders deserve different
penal treatment than their adult counterparts has been
recognized since the jurisprudence of antiquity. Early Muslim
law disallowed capital punishment of offenders under the age of
seventeen and required more merciful penalties for all
children.36 Early Jewish law also recognized “conditions under
which immaturity was to be considered in imposing
punishment.”37 Then came early Roman civil law, which
differentiated juveniles from adults by observing an “age of
responsibility.”38 By the fifth century, Roman law had developed
a tender-years doctrine that exempted all children under seven
from criminal liability.39 Children that had reached puberty
were viewed differently, however, as this developmental
milestone—age fourteen for boys, twelve for girls—established a
presupposition that pubescent “youth were assumed to know the
difference between right and wrong. . . .”40 These Roman civil
law principles later permeated eleventh- and twelfth-century
Anglo-Saxon common law, eventually making their way into
English common law.41
In the late eighteenth century, English common law, in
determining the appropriate punishment of juvenile offenders,
considered the age at which children were capable of
conceptualizing the nefariousness of their acts.42 Considered
“infants,” children younger than seven were not held liable for
36. RICHARD LAWRENCE & MARIO HESSE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE
ESSENTIALS 12 (Jerry Westby et al. eds., 2010).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
PART 1, at 4 [hereinafter THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 1], available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/
DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited May 21, 2015).
41. LAWRENCE & HESSE, supra note 36, at 12.
42. Id. (“Blackstone and his contemporaries drew the line between ‘infant’
and ‘adult’ at the point where one could understood [sic] one’s actions.”).
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Children over age fourteen were
committing felonies.43
considered “adults” and as such were susceptible to unrestricted
criminal punishment,44 yet children much younger could
potentially face the harshest penalties:
Between the ages of seven and fourteen was a
gray zone. A child in this age range would be
presumed incapable of crime. If, however, it
appeared that the child understood the difference
between right and wrong, the child could be
convicted and suffer the full consequences of the
crime. These consequences could include death in
a capital crime.45
The understanding that juvenile wrongdoers are less
culpable than their adult counterparts then made its way to the
Americas.46 As English common law formed the basis of United
States common law, the former’s practices regarding the
treatment of juvenile offenders, as well as the associated “gray
zone[s,]” took root in the United States.47
B. Development and Early Failures of the American Juvenile
Correction System
At the time of America’s independence, all criminal offenses
committed by juveniles in the United States were adjudicated in
adult criminal courts.48 By the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted in 1789, United States common law had established a
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 1, supra note 40, at 4.
47. Id. (“Early in United States history, the law was heavily influenced by
the common law of England, which governed the American colonies. One of the
most important English lawyers of the time was William Blackstone.
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, first published in the late
1760s, were widely read and admired by our nation’s founders.”).
48. Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It Is That You Threw
Your Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court In
Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope For a Second
Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 40 (2010).
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rebuttable presumption that children under fourteen lacked
“capacity” to commit capital offenses.49 “By the nineteenth
century, many child welfare advocates reformed the country’s
view of children. . . .”50 With goals of rehabilitating young
malefactors and safeguarding them from the inherent dangers
of incarceration in adult correctional institutions, “[s]ocial
reformers began to create special facilities for troubled juveniles.
. . .”51 In 1825, the New York House of Refuge was built to
accommodate juvenile criminals.52 A similar facility, the
Chicago Reform School, opened in Illinois in 1855.53 In 1899,
Cook County, Illinois established the United States’ first
juvenile court.54 “The idea quickly caught on, and within
twenty-five years, most states had set up juvenile court
systems.”55 Like the juvenile correctional facilities, the principal
objective of early juvenile courts was to rehabilitate young
wrongdoers, hoping to deter them from continuing lives of
crime.56
By the mid-twentieth century, flaws in the juvenile court
system had come to light. In 1959, after an attempted pursesnatching and a number of home break-ins, fourteen-year-old
Morris Kent, Jr. was placed on probation by the District of
Columbia Juvenile Court.57 Two years later, while still on
probation, Kent entered a woman’s apartment, raped her, and
stole her wallet.58 After being caught, Kent volunteered
information regarding additional crimes he had committed,
which left him facing eight criminal charges—“two instances of
housebreaking, robbery, and rape, and one of housebreaking and
robbery.”59 On these facts, it is more than evident that the
District of Columbia Juvenile Court system had not performed
49. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 361-62 (1989).
50. Wallace, supra note 48, at 40.
51. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 1, supra note 40, at 5.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (“[T]he ultimate goal was to guide a juvenile offender toward life
as a responsible, law-abiding adult.”).
57. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 549.
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its principal role of rehabilitating Kent, of deterring him from a
continued life of crime, of “guid[ing] [this] juvenile offender
toward life as a responsible, law-abiding adult.”60 Following his
initial arrest at age fourteen, the juvenile court’s oversight of
Kent during his probationary period consisted of releasing him
to his mother’s custody and interviewing him “from time to time.
. . .”61 Under the less than watchful eye of the District of
Columbia Juvenile Court, Kent had not only continued robbing
and breaking-and-entering, but had also become a repeated
rapist.
Yet Kent’s behavior alone does not fully elucidate the
juvenile court system’s failures. His case had been transferred
to adult criminal court and ultimately made its way to the
United States Supreme Court.62 Supreme Court Justice Fortas
noted, “There is much evidence that some juvenile courts,
including that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel,
facilities and techniques to perform adequately as
representatives of the State. . .at least with respect to children
charged with law violation.”63 Justice Fortas also explained that
since juvenile courts adjudicate juvenile crime on “the premise
that the proceedings are ‘civil’ in nature. . .[,]” juvenile offenders
are often not afforded the same rights as criminal defendants in
adult court, sometimes being deprived of prerogatives such as
“entitle[ment] to bail; to indictment by grand jury; to a speedy
and public trial; to trial by jury; to immunity against selfincrimination; to confrontation of his accusers; and in some
jurisdictions. . .entitle[ment] to counsel.”64 Justice Fortas
concluded that the failure of the juvenile court system to achieve
60. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 1, supra note 40, at 5.
61. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543.
62. Id. at 541. (The Supreme Court in Kent quoted “[t]he provision of the
Juvenile Court Act governing waiver…‘If a child sixteen years of age or older
is charged with an offense which would amount to a felony in the case of an
adult, or any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is
punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full
investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held for trial under the
regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if
committed by an adult; or such other court may exercise the powers conferred
upon the juvenile court in this subchapter in conducting and disposing of such
cases.’” Id. at 547-48.) See also discussion of waiver infra Part II.
63. Kent, 383 U.S.at 555-56.
64. Id. at 555.
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its principal goal of rehabilitating young wrongdoers raised
serious reservations as to the justifiability of depriving youths of
such momentous rights65: “There is evidence, in fact, that there
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.”66
Justice Fortas also revealed the District of Columbia
Juvenile Court’s failure to follow mandatory protocol in waiving
jurisdiction over Kent.67 Kent’s counsel motioned for a hearing
on the issue of waiver, armed with “an affidavit of a psychiatrist
certifying that petitioner ‘is a victim of servere [sic]
psychopathology’ and recommending hospitalization for
psychiatric observation[,]” and prepared to argue that Kent was
therefore a select candidate for institutional rehabilitation
under the supervision of the Juvenile Court.68 The Juvenile
Court judge, however, simply disregarded the motion. “The
Juvenile Court judge did not rule on these motions. He held no
hearing. He entered an order reciting that after ‘full
investigation, I do hereby waive’ jurisdiction of petitioner. . . .”69
Although the Juvenile Court had “presumably” reviewed reports
and suggestions from the Juvenile Probation Section and the
Juvenile Court staff, and had considered a social service file kept
on Kent throughout his probation, the Supreme Court held that
the Juvenile Court judge had not adhered to “the statutory
requirement of a ‘full investigation.’”70 The Supreme Court held
that Kent’s counsel had a right to actively take part in the
waiver decision and that the Juvenile Court judge was not
permitted to make such a consequential ruling “without any
hearing or statement or reasons. . .[,]” especially when the
defendant’s counsel had specifically motioned for a hearing on
65. Id. (“While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as
to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical
purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of
constitutional guaranties applicable to adults.”).
66. Id. at 556.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 545.
69. Id. at 546.
70. Id. at 553.
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the issue of waiver.71
In 1971, the Supreme Court again voiced its concern with
the inadequacies of the juvenile court system.72 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to appellants in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania to consider whether juveniles had a constitutional
right to a jury trial in state juvenile court delinquency
hearings.73 Appellants included Joseph McKeiver, who had been
charged in 1968 at age sixteen with larceny, robbery and
receiving stolen goods; juvenile Edward Terry, who in 1969 had
been charged with conspiracy and assaulting a police officer; and
more than forty-five African American juveniles ranging in age
from eleven to fifteen, who had been charged with willfully
impeding traffic while “protesting school assignments and a
school consolidation plan.”74 McKeiver and Terry had both been
denied jury trials by the Juvenile Branch of the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas. The African-American youth had been
denied the same by a North Carolina juvenile court.75
Writing for the plurality, Justice Blackmun discussed the
numerous and continuous constitutional dilemmas that the
Supreme Court had tackled concerning the protections—or lack
thereof—that the juvenile court systems have, since their
inception, afforded youthful offenders.76 The plurality held that
71. Id. at 553-54. (“The statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to
determine in isolation and without the participation or any representation of
the child the ‘critically important’ question whether a child will be deprived of
the special protections and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act. It does not
authorize the Juvenile Court, in total disregard of a motion for hearing filed by
counsel, and without any hearing or statement or reasons, to decide—as in this
case—that the child will be…transferred to jail along with adults, and that he
will be exposed to the possibility of a death sentence instead of treatment for a
maximum, in Kent's case, of five years, until he is 21.”).
72. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion).
73. The Court was divided on the issue: “Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, joined
by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice WHITE,
concluded that: 1. The applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings
is fundamental fairness…which emphasized factfinding procedures, but in our
legal system the jury is not a necessary component of accurate factfinding.”
(internal citations omitted).
74. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 534-36.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 531-34 (discussing United States Supreme Court cases,
including In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S.
28 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent, 383 U.S. 541; Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948)).
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“a jury trial is not constitutionally required in a juvenile court’s
adjudicative stage. . .[d]espite disappointments, failures, and
shortcomings in the juvenile court procedure. . . .”77 Justice
Blackmun noted the Court’s “disturbed concern about the
[juvenile court] judge who is untrained and less than fully
imbued with an understanding approach to the complex
problems of childhood and adolescence.”78 He further opined,
“Too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart,
protective, and communicating figure the [juvenile court] system
envisaged.”79 But Justice Blackmun addressed more than just
juvenile court judges, also noting a profusion of severe flaws in
juvenile court systems generally:
The community’s unwillingness to provide people
and facilities and to be concerned, the
insufficiency of time devoted, the scarcity of
professional help, the inadequacy of dispositional
alternatives, and our general lack of knowledge all
contribute to dissatisfaction with the [juvenile
court] experiment.80
Summing up this train of thought, Justice Blackmun wrote, “the
fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and
early reformers. . .have not been realized.”81 The Supreme
Court’s succinct and concerned presentation of the juvenile court
system’s many failures renders nearly irrefutable the conclusion
that juvenile offenders did not receive the protections and
assistance that the founders of the juvenile court system had
deemed necessary.82 It becomes easier, too, to comprehend why
juvenile offenders like Kent were not being properly
rehabilitated nor deterred from continuing lives of crime.83
77. Id. at 528.
78. Id. at 534. (Justice Blackmun made clear, however, that such
insufficiency of juvenile court judges is not always the case, expressing that
there is “at…the same time…an appreciation for the juvenile court judge who
is devoted, sympathetic, and conscientious….”).
79. Id. at 544.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Wallace, supra note 48.
83. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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III. History of Juvenile Waiver
Juvenile waiver laws similar to that which landed sixteenyear-old Morris Kent, Jr. in adult criminal court in the 1960s
had been in effect in the United States since the earliest days of
the juvenile court system.84 Despite widespread sentiment that
crimes committed by juvenile offenders should be adjudicated by
particularized juvenile courts, some of the earliest of these
tribunals had the ability to transfer matters to adult criminal
courts.85 Such transfers only occurred in “hard cases[,]” those
involving the most serious crimes, and were usually exercised
through judicial waiver, which “left transfer decisions to the
discretion of juvenile court judges.”86
By the mid-twentieth century, juvenile court judges in many
states possessed the discretionary power to waive jurisdiction
over such cases.87 By the early 1970s, nearly every states’
juvenile code conferred this power upon juvenile court judges.88
“Automatic transfer laws,” which mandated judicial waiver in
cases involving juveniles charged with crimes such as murder
and other capital offenses, were less common, as were “exclusion
laws,” which required that matters involving juveniles similarly
charged bypass juvenile court entirely.89 Even more rare were
laws granting prosecutors discretion to charge serious juvenile
offenders in adult criminal court.90 Throughout the 1970s and
1980s, however, there was a heavy increase in automatic
transfer laws, as well as “prosecutor-controlled forms of transfer.
. . .”91
84. AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
PART 2, 10 [hereinafter THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 2]. See also
Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer
Laws and Reporting, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L REPORT SERIES BULLETIN 8
(2011) (“Laws allowing juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction over individual
youth, sending “hard cases” to criminal courts for adult prosecution, could be
found in some of the earliest juvenile codes and have always been relatively
common.”).
85. Griffin et al., supra note 84, at 2, 9.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (Only Georgia and Florida had such laws before 1970).
91. Id. (“[A]utomatic and prosecutor-controlled forms of transfer
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Yet, in Rhode Island in 1989, fifteen-year-old Craig Price
was sentenced to less than six years for two counts of burglary
and four counts of murder.92 This seems an odd result
considering Rhode Island has continuously allowed judicial
waiver since 191593: “With the enactment of P.L.1915, ch. 1185 .
. . juveniles, defined by said Act as children under the age of 16,
were, except for murder and manslaughter, exempt from [adult]
prosecutions.”94 The statute was amended in 1944, changing the
definition of “juveniles” to children under eighteen.95 However,
the 1944 amendment contained a more notable alteration, at
least vis-à-vis situations such as Price’s. The amendment
granted juvenile courts jurisdiction over murder and
manslaughter charges, but the “juvenile court was authorized .
. . to waive its jurisdiction as to juveniles 16 or 17 years of age.”96
At age fifteen, Price did not make the cut. Thus, although
Arsenault’s assertion that “Rhode Island law in 1989 did not
permit the State to hold minors past their 21st birthday, no
matter what their crime[]”97 is not fully accurate, the Family
Court (successor to the Rhode Island Juvenile Court) could not
waive jurisdiction over a fifteen-year-old quadruple murderer.98
From the mid-1980s through the end of the 1990s, concern
over increases in violent crimes committed by youths prompted
an intense nationwide stiffening of juvenile waiver laws.99
Sparked by “media focus on the rise in violent youth crime that
began in 1987 and peaked in 1994. . .” and outcries from the
subsequently perturbed public, “legislatures in nearly every
state revised or rewrote their laws to lower thresholds and
proliferated steadily. In the 1970s alone, five states enacted new prosecutorial
discretion laws, and seven more states adopted some form of automatic
transfer. By the mid-1980s, nearly all states had judicial waiver laws, 20 states
had automatic transfer laws, and 7 states had prosecutorial discretion laws.”).
92. See State v. Price, 820 A.2d 956, 959 (R.I. 2003).
93. 1915 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1185.
94. In re McCloud, 293 A.2d 512, 515 (R.I. 1972).
95. 1944 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1441; see id. n.5.
96. McCloud, 293 A.2d at 515 n.5 (explaining 1944 R.I. Pub. Laws ch.
1441).
97. Into Another World, supra note 1, at 6 (emphasis added).
98. Rhode Island dissolved its Juvenile Court system in 1961, vesting all
of its powers and jurisdiction in the Family Court. See 1961 R.I. Pub. Laws ch.
73. See also McCloud, 293 A.2d at 515 n.5.
99. Griffin et al., supra note 84, at 9.
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broaden eligibility for transfer. . . .”100 Additionally, waiver
decision-making power once vested in juvenile court judges was
assigned to prosecutors, and the “individualized discretion” that
juvenile court judges once possessed was superseded by
“automatic and categorical mechanisms.”101 Exclusion laws, for
example, that had previously required that juvenile murder
cases be adjudicated in adult criminal court, were expanded to
include a wide array of violent crimes.102
The instant reaction of Warwick, Rhode Island residents to
the Heaton triple murder exemplifies the terror and
apprehensiveness that result from an increase in violent crime.
As Arsenault explained, “The Heaton murders drove Rhode
Island into a state of fear and paranoia. . . . Home owners nailed
windows shut, cancelled evening walks, cuddled baseball bats in
their sleep . . . and adopted watchdogs from the pounds.”103
Although fervent public concern with increasing crime is
understandable, the fortified legislation was undoubtedly
stringent. In fact, the Supreme Court would later rule that
many of the results obtained by the intense increases in juvenile
waiver legislation violated the United States Constitution.
IV. Unconstitutional Effects of Increased Juvenile Waiver
Legislation
In 1986, William Thompson was convicted by jury verdict of
first-degree murder in the District Court of Grady County,
Oklahoma.104 Thompson, along with three co-defendants,
received the death penalty for participating in the 1983 “brutal
murder” of his former brother-in-law.105 The victim had been
shot, slashed and beaten, chained to a block of concrete, and

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. This Dark Deed, supra note 6, at 7 (Not surprisingly, gun sales also
soared in Warwick: “One Warwick gun dealer sold five shotguns to…women
the week after the killings. Another reported selling six semiautomatic
handguns. ‘They’re scared, scared to hell,’ he said.”).
104. See Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), rev’d,
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
105. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815 (1988).
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thrown into a river.106 Thompson was fifteen at the time of the
murder.107 Despite the gruesome details of Thompson’s crime,
the United States Supreme Court vacated the verdict in 1988,
holding that the “‘cruel and unusual punishments’ prohibition of
the Eighth Amendment. . .prohibits the execution of a person
who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her
offense.”108 In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor cast
aspersions on the Oklahoma legislation that led to Thompson’s
sentence:
[I]n enacting a statute authorizing capital
punishment for murder without setting any
minimum age, and in separately providing that
juvenile defendants may be treated as adults in
some circumstances, the Oklahoma Legislature
either did not realize that its actions would
effectively render 15-year-olds death eligible or
did not give the question the serious consideration
that would have been reflected in the explicit
choice of a particular minimum age.109
The Thompson Court also noted the conventional concepts
apparently disavowed by the Oklahoma Legislature.110 In the
plurality opinion’s Eighth Amendment discussion, Justice
Stevens alluded to many of the same principles regarding
juvenile culpability considered significant by our societies since
antiquity:
Less culpability should attach to a crime
committed by a juvenile. . .since inexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of
his or her conduct. . . . [H]e or she is much more
106. Thompson, 724 P.2d at 781.
107. Id.
108. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”)
109. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 817 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
110. See id.
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apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer
pressure than is an adult. . . .111
Justice Stevens continued, “Given this lesser culpability, as well
as the teenager’s capacity for growth and society’s fiduciary
obligations to its children, the retributive purpose underlying
the death penalty is simply inapplicable to the execution of a 15year-old offender.”112
Justice Stevens’ stance in Thompson, which mirrors our
societal viewpoints since antiquity in regards to juveniles’
limited decision-making and judgment capabilities, is today
supported by more than mere social understanding.113 The fields
of physiology and psychosociology soundly explain the
differences between adolescents and adults, which account for
juveniles’ restricted ability to make principled judgments.114
Samantha Schad asserts that during adolescence—ages twelve
through seventeen—“the adolescent brain undergoes dramatic
changes. . . . [T]he brain. . .matures.”115 During this evolutionary
process, adolescents tend to “experience increases in reward
seeking, which translates into vulnerability for risky
behavior.”116 Numerous psychosocial factors—weighing more
heavily the short-term outcomes of one’s actions than the longterm, longing for peer acceptance, and sheer impulsivity—also
influence adolescent decision-making, which all too commonly
results in the commission of crimes.117
Although “an
adolescent’s cognitive skills are fairly mature by age sixteen. .
.[,]” Schad explains, “because adolescents are more prone to
psychosocial immaturity, they tend to be less mature than
adults when it comes to their judgment and decision making

111. Id. at 816.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See Samantha Schad, Adolescent Decision Making: Reduced
Culpability in the Criminal Justice System & Recognition of Capability in
Other Legal Contexts, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 375 (2011).
115. Id. at 377.
116. Id. at 378.
117. Id. at 380-81. Note Justice Stevens’ agreement in Thompson: “[A
Juvenile] is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure
than is an adult….” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 816.
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capacity.”118 With this recent scientific explication of what has
been widespread social understanding for millennia, the
juvenile correction system’s return to these principles appears
not only socially, but also naturally necessary. And, as Justice
Stevens declared in Thompson, the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution mandates such realignment.119
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court
again addressed Eighth Amendment concerns raised by juvenile
sentencing.120 In 2003, sixteen-year-old Terrance Graham,
along with three other youths, attempted to rob a Florida
restaurant.121 After entering the restaurant, Graham and one
of his accomplices encountered the manager, whom Graham’s
cohort struck in the head with a metal bar.122 The youths
thereafter fled the scene without having taken any money.123
Graham was charged with a first-degree felony, armed burglary

118. Schad, supra note 114, at 381. Consider Schad’s example of “how
cognitive capacity and psychosocial factors affect the decision making process:”
Imagine that a teenager is at the mall shopping with some of
her friends. She wants to buy a new pair of sunglasses, but
does not have the money. One friend suggests that she steal
the glasses. As her friends begin to leave the store, she
impulsively puts the sunglasses in her purse. She exits the
store and the alarm goes off. Because adolescent cognitive
skills mature before an adolescent becomes psychosocially
mature, this teenager had the cognitive skills to know that
stealing is against the law. She also had the cognitive
capacity to know that it is wrong. However, at the moment
she puts the sunglasses in her purse, she is not thinking
about the future consequences of her actions. She does not
think about going to jail or appearing in front of a judge. She
is only thinking about the immediate reward of having the
glasses she cannot afford. She is thinking about impressing
her friends. She is not considering five minutes from now
when she will be sitting in a police car waiting for her parents
to pick her up. While she may have the cognitive capacity to
make the right decision, her judgment is impaired by the
factors of psychosocial immaturity.
Id.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id.
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with assault or battery, and a second-degree felony, attempted
armed-robbery.124 He was charged as an adult pursuant to
Florida’s prosecutorial-discretion statute, which places in the
prosecutor’s hands the decision of whether to charge sixteenand seventeen-year-olds facing felonies as juveniles or adults.125
Pursuant to a plea deal, Graham pleaded guilty to both
crimes, but the trial court “withheld adjudication of guilt. . .” and
released Graham on three years’ probation.126 Less than six
months later, Graham, then seventeen, and two twenty-year-old
accomplices committed a home-invasion armed-robbery.127
Graham attempted a second robbery that same night, and was
subsequently arrested after a high-speed chase with police.128
During police questioning, Graham admitted to having
committed “two to three” other robberies.129
Upon violating probation, Graham was sentenced for the
first- and second-degree felonies stemming from the botched
restaurant robbery.130 The seventeen-year-old received the
maximum penalty allowable for each charge under Florida
law—fifteen years for attempted armed robbery and life
imprisonment for armed burglary.131
The latter charge,
however, is yet more relentless than it appears on its face, for,
due to Florida’s termination of its parole system, a life sentence
in Florida meant that Graham would indubitably serve a life
sentence without the possibility of parole.132 The trial judge
expressed his reasoning for imposing the harshest possible
sentence in disregard of the Florida Department of Corrections’
124. Id.
125. FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(b) (2007) (formerly—and at the time of
Graham’s prosecution—FLA. STAT. § 985.227(1)(b) (2003)). See supra Part II
discussion of prosecutorial discretion.
126. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53-54.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 54-55.
129. Id. at 55. (Similar to Morris Kent, Jr., Graham continued a life of
crime while on probation. In Kent’s situation, the failure of the juvenile
probation system to rehabilitate and redirect young wrongdoers is apparent.
Graham, however, was serving probation in Florida’s adult system. Evidently,
Florida’s adult system did an equally poor job of correcting Graham’s criminal
behavior.). See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
130. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
131. Id. at 57.
132. See FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003).
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recommendation that Graham receive a sentence of not more
than four years, as well as the State’s recommendation that
Graham serve thirty years for armed robbery and fifteen years
for attempted armed burglary:
[Y]ou had a judge who took the step to try and give
you direction through his probation order to give
you a chance to get back onto track. . . . And I don’t
know why it is that you threw your life away. . . .
[I]f I can’t do anything to help you, if I can’t do
anything to get you back on the right path, then I
have to start focusing on the community and
trying to protect the community from your
actions. . . . [T]hat is where we are today. . . .
You’ve evidently decided this is the direction
you’re going to take in life, and it’s unfortunate
that you made that choice. I have reviewed the
statute. I don’t see where any further juvenile
sanctions would be appropriate. I don’t see where
any youthful offender sanctions would be
appropriate.133
Yet the trial judge’s comments do not harmonize with the
understanding of juvenile culpability deemed by Justice Stevens
in Thompson to be pivotally important to the proper treatment
of juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment.134 Nor do
his words conform to scientific fact.135 To express that there is
no hope for a juvenile offender, that he has made a conscious
decision at age seventeen to adhere to a continued and ceaseless
life of crime until the end of his days, is to deny the youth’s
ability to change; it is to disregard the scientific factors that
affect adolescent decision-making and risk analysis.136 It is also
to disavow a social conviction that has been accepted for
thousands of years—that adolescents, due to various forces
acting upon and within them, are plagued by an inability to align

133.
134.
135.
136.

See Graham, 560 U.S. at 56-57.
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
See supra notes 113-18 & accompanying text.
See Schad, supra note 114.
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themselves with rigid morality.137
The United States Supreme Court likewise disagreed with
the trial judge’s sentiment.138 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to settle Graham’s contention that his sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole violated the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.139
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which he
expressed an attitude antithetical to that professed by the trial
judge who handed down Graham’s sentence.140 The opinion
begins with an air of intensity, as Justice Kennedy explained the
Eighth Amendment’s import: “The Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause prohibits the imposition of inherently
barbaric punishments under all circumstances. . . . [U]nder the
Eighth Amendment, the State must respect the human
attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.”141
Justice Kennedy noted that juveniles are “less deserving of the
most severe punishments. . .” due to their “lessened culpability.
. .[,]”142 expressing a view of juvenile culpability akin to that
conveyed by Justice Stevens in Thompson. In support of its
position, the Court noted juveniles’ slighter understanding of
responsibility, their vulnerability to peer pressure, and their
relative immaturity.143
Further, relying on the scientific
discourse that is the subject of Schad’s work, the Court stated
that juvenile malefactors are indeed more likely to reform than
their adult counterparts.144 Specifically, the Court explained,
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For
example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue
to mature through late adolescence.”145 Justice Kennedy put it
simply: “Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults. .
. . ‘[I]t would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with
those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7

Id.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
Id. at 59 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 68 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
Id. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).
Id.
Id. at 68.
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character deficiencies will be reformed.’”146
The Graham Court held that sentencing “juveniles,” which
it defined as all convicts under the age of eighteen, who had not
committed homicide to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Justice Kennedy explained that
Punishment Clause.147
sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole entails an exceptionally more merciless punishment
than when the same sentence is handed to older convicts,148
noting that “[a] 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to
life without parole receive the same punishment in name
only.”149 The difference being that a juvenile offender will
generally remain imprisoned for a greater portion of his or her
life and will generally serve more years than adults likewise
The Court exempted juveniles convicted of
sentenced.150
homicide from its holding on the grounds that, despite their age,
such adolescent wrongdoers exhibit greater moral culpability
than juveniles convicted of felonies that, although serious, do not
involve killing.151
Terrance Graham received the cruel and unusual,
unconstitutional sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole due to the compounding effects of multiple
factors. Contrary to early juvenile court practices in the United
States, the prosecutor, rather than the juvenile court judge,
chose to remove Graham from the juvenile forum.152
Considering the trial judge’s exceeding departure from the wellsettled jurisprudential understanding of juvenile culpability, it
is clear that Graham’s case was not adjudicated in a court that
was appropriately geared to properly sentence adolescent

146. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
147. Id. at 48.
148. Id. at 71.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 50.
151. Id. at 69. The Graham Court also reasoned that, “[w]ith respect to
life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders, none of the goals of
penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate—retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, provides an adequate
justification.” Id. at 71-74.
152. See supra Part II discussion of juvenile waiver.
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wrongdoers.153 There was also a rather enigmatic problem at
play, similar to the one identified by Justice O’Connor in
Thompson, concerning the results of apparently hasty, illconsidered legislation.154 Florida legislation at the time of
Graham’s sentencing was amiss. As the “[s]tate acknowledged
at oral argument[,]. . .even a 5–year–old, theoretically, could
receive [life without the possibility of parole] under the letter of
the law.”155 The ridiculousness of such a statutory effect
illustrates an unquestionable lack of “deliberate, express, and
full legislative consideration.”156 The various forces that acted
upon Graham and led to his unconstitutional sentence illustrate
the collective interaction among elements within the juvenile
correction system, which together culminate in the overall
failure of that system.
V. Conclusion
This Comment’s historical analysis seeks to inculcate its
readers with an understanding that, due to an array of scientific
factors, juvenile wrongdoers are quite often less culpable for
their criminal acts than their adult counterparts. The necessary
changes to the American juvenile correction system are many.
And with each and every necessary change, roadblocks to their
effectuation are certain. Monetary deficiency may be the most
arduous difficulty that reformation of the juvenile correction
system currently faces. States nationwide must succeed in
tackling this currently overarching dilemma before juvenile
correction systems will become properly funded and staffed, and
therefore properly equipped to address their many failures.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted our
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment as requiring certain changes
within the juvenile correction system, which the States cannot
deny. Societal principles, millennia-old as well as currently
153. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
154. See Justice O’Connor’s criticism of the Oklahoma statute that
allowed capital punishment of minors who were under the age of sixteen at the
time of their offense. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815 (1988)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
155. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.
156. Id.
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operative, and scientific support thereof also mandate necessary
changes. The States and their judiciaries cannot ignore the
demands of societal mores and scientific proof any more than
they can decline to adhere to the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the United States Constitution.
***
After confessing in 1989 to the brutal Spencer and Heaton
murders, the Rhode Island Family Court ordered Craig Price
committed to the Rhode Island State Training School until
October 11, 1994, Price’s twenty-first birthday.157 Prosecutors,
along with the entire State of Rhode Island, considered the
sentence abhorrently deficient.158 When Price’s public defender
learned that prosecutors were contemplating the possibility of
having Price committed to a mental institution, she immediately
advised Price not to cooperate with psychiatric personnel,
despite a court order to do so.159 In 1993, Price was charged with
assault and extortion after allegedly threatening to “snuff out” a
Training School correctional officer.160 “Craig Price became the
first Training School youth in memory prosecuted for a verbal
confrontation[.]”161 Price was found guilty by jury verdict and
received a fifteen-year sentence, seven to serve, eight
suspended.162 Price thereafter continued to defy repeated court
orders to undergo psychiatric evaluation.163 Rhode Island
Attorney General Jeffrey Pine urged the court to hold Price in
contempt for his ongoing failure to cooperate.164 The trial court
agreed and imposed a one-year sentence for civil contempt,
157. Mark Arsenault, ‘Flame of Hope’—Craig Price’s Story, THE
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 9, 2004, at A-01 [hereinafter Flame of Hope].
158. Id.
159. Id. See State v. Price, 820 A.2d 956, 960 (R.I. 2003) (“[H]is
withdrawal from the diagnostic and treatment process resulted from fear
expressed by his attorney that this psychiatric examination might lead to a
civil commitment under the Mental Health Law, G.L.1956 chapter 5 of title
406, that could result in his being placed into a psychiatric facility for
commitment beyond his twenty-first birthday.”) Id.
160. Flame of Hope, supra note 157 (internal quotations marks omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Price, 820 A.2d at 963.
164. Id.; Flame of Hope, supra note 157.
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which would terminate at anytime upon Price’s compliance with
the court order.165 Price finally agreed to undergo psychiatric
evaluation, but doctors reported that Price had lied during the
sessions about his involvement in the Spencer and Heaton
murders.166 The prosecution then moved to hold Price in
criminal contempt.167 Price was found guilty by jury verdict of
criminal contempt and sentenced to twenty-five years, ten to
serve, fifteen suspended contingent upon good behavior.168 Price
failed to satisfy the conditions of his suspended sentence, when
in 1998 he “stomped on” a correctional officer, and in 2001 beat
up another inmate.169
Price is currently serving his twenty-five-year sentence for
criminal contempt.
If he can manage to avoid further
prosecution, the 300-pound Warwick Slasher who, when
Arsenault first met with him in 2002, wore a XXXXL prison
jumpsuit and was capable of bench-pressing 485 pounds,170 is
scheduled for release in 2022.171

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
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